Rebalancing the Sticks and the Carrots? A New DOJ White-Collar Enforcement Plan

The Justice Department’s new white-collar enforcement plan highlights shifting enforcement priorities to focus on “key threats” and significant changes to self-disclosure and monitor selection policies. The self-disclosure changes make clear that companies will avoid criminal prosecution if they voluntarily disclose wrongdoing to the government, fully cooperate, remediate harm, and avoid specific aggravating circumstances. Under the new approach, it is more important than ever for companies to identify potential wrongdoing early and engage counsel to conduct a swift, thorough, and credible investigation; improve and implement compliance programs; and, where appropriate, report their findings to the government.

Introduction

Given the recent changes the Trump Administration has made at the Department of Justice (DOJ),^[1]  many people have wondered when a formal change to the DOJ’s white-collar prosecution policies, particularly the corporate self-disclosure policy, might come. During remarks at a Financial Crimes Conference on May 12, Matthew Galeotti, the new Head of the DOJ’s Criminal Division, announced some of the changes to the DOJ’s policies, starting with the new commitment to be less “heavy-handed with the stick, and [less] stingy with the carrot.”  

In the new white-collar enforcement plan, titled “Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime” (Enforcement Plan), Galeotti recognized the significant threat white-collar crime poses to U.S. interests and national security, highlighting international money laundering organizations’ role in facilitating cartels and transnational criminal organizations, and sanctions evasion by hostile nation-states and terror regimes.^[2]  But, according to Galeotti, recent corporate enforcement efforts have “come at too high a cost for businesses and American enterprise.” He expressed his frustration with the “unchecked and long-running investigations” that prove costly to the DOJ and the targeted companies. Galeotti said these types of investigations unduly interfere with business operations, stymie innovation, and deter cooperation.

To address these concerns, Galeotti announced major changes to the DOJ’s Enforcement Plan. On the same day, Galeotti issued a memorandum detailing the changes and instructing Criminal Division attorneys to follow “three core tenets: (1) focus; (2) fairness; and (3) efficiency.”^[3] 

The DOJ’s most significant changes involve adjustments to the Criminal Division’s priorities and revisions to key policies related to self-disclosure, monitor selection, and whistleblowers. The revised Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (Self-Disclosure Policy), in particular, simplifies how the DOJ communicates its requirements and outcomes to companies that wish to engage in self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation. Galeotti stressed that a fair justice system is a transparent one, reasoning that the “more easily understandable” Self-Disclosure Policy will aid companies and counsel in decision-making when faced with potential misconduct.^[4] 

Shifting Priorities

The Criminal Division’s focus will shift away from enforcement actions and investigations involving corporations and financial institutions that “want to play by the rules.” Instead, the DOJ will target what Galeotti referred to as “the most egregious white-collar crime.”^[5] 

To that end, Galeotti instructed prosecutors to focus their white-collar prosecution efforts on “key threats” to America, including fraud perpetrated against Americans as individuals, as taxpayers, and as recipients of government services. He also directed prosecutors to “take all reasonable steps to minimize the length and collateral impact of their investigations,” with an eye toward ensuring swift justice and efficient use of resources.^[6] This approach echoes the priorities of the Department of Government Efficiency.^[7] 

In his memorandum, Galeotti listed 10 specific “high-impact areas” the Criminal Division will prioritize, including areas such as:

• “Waste, fraud, and abuse, including health care fraud and federal program and procurement fraud that harm the public fisc”;^[8] 
• Trade and customs fraud;
• Complex frauds that victimize U.S. investors (e.g., Ponzi schemes);
• Certain crimes involving digital assets;^[9] and
• Bribery and money laundering that “impact U.S. national interests, undermine U.S. national security, harm the competitiveness of U.S. businesses, and enrich foreign corrupt officials.”^[10] 

Notably, several of the identified “high impact areas,” including ending waste, fraud, and abuse emphasized throughout the Galeotti Memorandum, are squarely aligned with the government's focus under the False Claims Act suggesting that criminal investigations in these areas may run parallel with FCA investigations.^[11] 

Changes to Key Policies

Next, Galeotti announced changes to three key policies: the Self-Disclosure Policy, the monitor selection policy, and the Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program.

1. Changes to the Self-Disclosure Policy

Recognizing the role of American companies in thwarting serious crime by providing “critical information” to help the DOJ prosecute bad actors, Galeotti said the Self-Disclosure Policy had become “unwieldy and hard to navigate.” Therefore, in an effort to be more transparent, he directed the DOJ’s Fraud Section and the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section to simplify the Self-Disclosure Policy and clarify expected outcomes. Galeotti’s primary message was, “Self-disclosure is key to receiving the most generous benefits the Criminal Division can offer.”^[12] 

Under the revised Self-Disclosure Policy, companies that meet core requirements—voluntary self-disclosure to the Criminal Division, full cooperation, timely and appropriate remediation, and no aggravating circumstances—will receive a declination and will not be prosecuted.^[13] Companies with aggravating circumstances that otherwise meet these requirements may still be eligible for a declination based on the severity of the aggravating circumstances weighed against the company’s cooperation and remediation.

Finally, companies that “in good faith self-disclose either not quickly enough or after—unbeknownst to them—the DOJ has already become aware of the misconduct” are still eligible to receive significant benefits. These potential benefits include a Non-Prosecution Agreement^[14] with a term of under three years, a 75% reduction of the criminal fine, and no longer requiring a corporate monitor.

The revised Self-Disclosure Policy undercuts DOJ’s warnings in 2022 that “undue or intentional delay” in producing important evidence “will result in the reduction or denial of cooperation credit.”^[15] Those prior warnings were accompanied by uncertainty over what constitutes “timely” disclosure and highlighted a company’s difficult choice between speedy disclosure and conducting a thorough internal investigation. The revised policy, and Galeotti’s remarks, signal that the DOJ is now more likely to give companies the benefit of the doubt.

2. Changes to the Corporate Monitor Selection Policy

Companies can expect to see fewer corporate monitorships because, according to Galeotti, “the value monitors add is often outweighed by the costs they impose.” He explained that monitors can create an adversarial relationship with companies, impose significant expense, and unduly interfere with business, and he suggested the money companies spend on their monitors could be better spent investing in their compliance programs or reimbursing victims.

Galeotti also acknowledged that “a narrowly-tailored monitorship . . . can be an effective resource to provide independent oversight and review to companies that are struggling to implement effective compliance programs on their own.” To balance these considerations, the Criminal Division is undertaking a totality-of-the-circumstances review of preexisting monitorships in an effort to narrow their scope or, where appropriate, terminate a monitorship altogether.

The revised monitor selection policy sets out factors prosecutors must consider in both imposing and narrowly tailoring a monitorship.^[16] Where a monitor is imposed, the revised policy aims to ensure that costs are proportionate to the underlying criminal conduct, the company’s profits, and the company’s size and risk profile by requiring a fee cap, approved budgets for all work plans, and biannual meetings between DOJ, the monitor, and the company.

3. Changes to the Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program

Under the Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program (Pilot Program) launched on August 1, 2024, whistleblowers who provide the Criminal Division with truthful information about corporate misconduct may be eligible for significant monetary awards.^[17] Under Galeotti’s direction, the Pilot Program will focus on targeting the “worst actors and most egregious crimes” by adding new “priority areas of focus.” 

The new focus areas are:

• Corporate procurement fraud;
• Trade, tariff, and customs fraud;
• Corporate sanctions offenses;
• Violations of federal immigration law; and
• Violations involving material support of foreign terrorist organizations, or those relating to international cartels and transnational criminal organizations.^[18] 

Key Takeaways

The new white-collar enforcement plan incentivizes companies’ self-disclosure through more transparent requirements and potential benefits for cooperation, streamlined investigations, and fewer monitorships. As outlined below, DOJ’s rebalancing of how it wields the stick and dangles the carrot has significant implications for American companies and their counsel.

• The DOJ has made it clear it will focus white-collar prosecution efforts on 10 “high-impact areas,” with particular emphasis on “key threats” to America.
• “Self-disclosure is key to receiving the most generous benefits the Criminal Division can offer.” Companies can now expect a declination if they voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate fully, make timely and appropriate remediation, and have no aggravating circumstances.
• Companies that do not meet all the core requirements necessary to secure a declination may still be eligible for declination and may otherwise expect less-onerous outcomes where they engage in self-disclosure and cooperation.
• Companies can expect to see fewer corporate monitorships, and the monitorships that already exist or will be put in place will be narrowly tailored and less costly.
• The DOJ has added new “priority areas of focus” to the Pilot Program, such as trade, tariff, and customs fraud, corporate sanctions offenses, and violations of federal immigration law.

If you have any questions regarding this or related subjects or if you need assistance, please contact the authors of this article, Suzanne Jaffe Bloom (Partner and Co-Chair, Government Investigations, Enforcement, and Compliance Practice), Marc Krickbaum (Partner and Co-Chair, Government Investigations, Enforcement, and Compliance Practice), Jack Knight (Partner and Chair, Financial Services Litigation Practice), Richard Weber (Partner and Co-Chair, Financial Crimes Compliance Practice), Elizabeth Ireland (Partner, Government Investigations, Enforcement, and Compliance Practice), Patrick Doerr (Partner, Government Investigations, Enforcement, and Compliance Practice), Hollie Albin (Associate, General Litigation Practice), or your Winston & Strawn relationship attorney. You can also visit our Government Investigations, Enforcement, & Compliance Practice webpage and our Government Program Fraud, False Claims Act & Qui Tam Litigation Playbook for more information on this and related subjects.

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[1] See The Oval Update, Winston & Strawn LLP, https://www.winston.com/en/oval-update.

[2]   Galeotti also discussed fraud.

[3]   Memorandum from Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of Dep’t of Just. Crim. Div., Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime (May 12, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400046/dl?inline [hereinafter Galeotti Memorandum].

[4]   Id. at 6.

[5]   This shifting focus aligns with other recent changes in DOJ priorities. See, e.g., Richard Weber et al., What Now for White Collar? As the DOJ Steps Back, Will Others Step Up?, Winston & Strawn Insights and News (Mar. 17, 2025), https://www.winston.com/en/insights-news/what-now-for-white-collar-as-the-doj-steps-back-will-others-step-up.  

[6]   Galeotti Memorandum at 7.

[7]   See, e.g., Exec. Order 14219, 90 Fed. Reg. 10583 (Feb. 19, 2025), Ensuring Lawful Governance and Implementing the President’s “Department of Government Efficiency” Deregulatory Initiative (stating “agencies shall preserve their limited enforcement resources”), https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-03138.pdf.

[8]   Galeotti also emphasized “waste, fraud, and abuse at the hands of bad actors in government agencies.” Galeotti Memorandum at 2.

[9]   See, e.g., Richard Weber et al., The New DOJ Enforcement Policy for Digital Assets: Why Compliance Programs Still Matter, Winston & Strawn Insights and News (May 13, 2025), https://www.winston.com/en/insights-news/the-new-doj-enforcement-policy-for-digital-assets-why-compliance-programs-still-matter.  

[10] The remaining “high-impact areas” include (1) fraud perpetrated through variable interest entities; (2) conduct that threatens U.S. national security, including sanctions violations; (3) material support by corporations to foreign terrorist organizations; (4) complex money laundering; and (5) violations of the Controlled Substances Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Galeotti Memorandum at 4.

[11] See, e.g., Suzanne Jaffe Bloom et al., Future FCA Enforcement Expectations in Light of New Administration Priorities and 2024 Recoveries (May 1, 2025), https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/government-program-fraud-false-claims-act-and-qui-tam-litigation-playbook/future-fca-enforcement-expectations-in-light-of-new-administration-priorities-and-2024-recoveries.

[12] This guidance builds on the statements of the prior administration related to self-disclosure. See, e.g., Suzanne Jaffe Bloom et al., DOJ’s Changes to Corporate Enforcement Policy Present Obstacles, Winston & Strawn Insights and News (Feb. 1, 2023), https://www.winston.com/en/insights-news/dojs-changes-to-corporate-enforcement-policy-present-obstacles.

[13] The revised Self-Disclosure Policy includes a flowchart showing the path to declination and other outcomes. See Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-47.120 (Updated 2025), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400031/dl?inline.

[14] Non-Prosecution Agreements “are, in essence, agreements not to enforce the law under particular conditions.” Entering into Non-prosecution Agreements in Return for Cooperation—Considerations to be Weighed, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.620 (Updated 2022), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.620.

[15] Suzanne Jaffe Bloom et al., How to Navigate DOJ’s Update on Corporate Criminal Enforcement, Winston & Strawn Insights and News (Oct. 27, 2022), https://www.winston.com/en/insights-news/how-to-navigate-dojs-update-on-corporate-criminal-enforcement.

[16] The factors include (1) the nature and seriousness of the conduct and the risk that it will happen again, with a focus on harms to Americans and American businesses; (2) the availability of other effective independent government oversight; (3) the efficacy of the company’s compliance program and culture of compliance at the time of resolution; and (4) the maturity of the company’s controls and the ability of the company to test and update its compliance program.

[17] Suzanne Jaffe Bloom & Patrick Doerr, DOJ’s New Whistleblower Tip Line Is Open and Companies Should Be Prepared, Winston & Strawn Insights & News (Aug. 9, 2024), https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/investigations-enforcement-and-compliance-alerts/dojs-new-whistleblower-tip-line-is-open-and-companies-should-be-prepared.

[18] Galeotti Memorandum at 5.